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Cartel recidivism has been discovered among many convicted firms and is often perceived as a result 
of the limited efficiency of competition policy. The incentives for managers to collude have been linked 
to the firm’s organizational structure, the corporate culture, and the type of executive compensation 
packages in place. 
To the extent that undetected cartels differ from detected ones in relevant dimensions, the current 
empirical results on illegal cartels are biased. To tackle this issue, we use a novel dataset of a 
population of cartels, which were legal in Sweden up until 1993. We contribute to the current debate 
on the importance and extent of recidivism, exploiting managers’ willingness to collude (repeatedly), 
absent law enforcement. This is a particularly important issue in the current climate of (potentially) 
weak law enforcement in terms of detected cartels and lack of optimal enforcement tools. 
We illustrate how recidivism is, in a legal setting, a widespread phenomenon.  We show that: (i) cartel 
members tend to be multiple colluders (MCs), i.e., participate in many cartels (up to 63 in a 46-year 
period); (ii) MCs tend to collude with similar firms, refuse entry and/or exit from the agreement and 
have less-strict governance rules (fewer meetings, fewer voting mechanisms and a less delineated 
hierarchy); and (iii) contrary to the current literature, there is no clear trend between the MCs and the 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recidivism in any criminal setting is often considered a failure of the system in fighting such behavior, 
as well as a clear sign of the limited effectiveness of its enforcement tools. Recidivism in collusive 
behavior is no exception. The fact that many cases of recidivism have been discovered among 
convicted cartel members is often perceived as a result of the limited efficiency of competition policy 
(Levenstein et al., 2016). 
Several reasons have been put forward to explain cartel recidivism. The current literature argues that 
recidivism, just like explicit collusion per se, is more frequent in industries with a high degree of market 
concentration (e.g. Pirrong, 1992), with inelastic demand (e.g. Grout and Sonderegger, 2005), or 
where a culture of collusion was established over time (e.g. Spar, 1994). Recidivism can be also 
explained at the managerial level, since the decision to collude is often taken by higher-level 
managers. Ashton and Pressey (2012) document that marketing and sales managers were involved in 
43% of 56 cartels convicted by the European Commission (EC) between 1990 and 2009 and were 
frequently those deciding to enter a collusive agreement. More recently, Bloomfield et al., (2020b) 
examine the position of all the individuals named in EC cartel fines (1996–2020) and indicted by the 
US Department of Justice (DOJ) (1984–2011) and find that chief executive officers and chairs are 
named/indicted in only 12% of EC and 7.5% of DOJ cases, whereas general and division managers are 
named indicted in 41% of EC and 34% of DOJ cases. Levenstein et al. (2016) also discuss a learning-by-
doing effect, where firms (and managers) collude because they imitate their peers – previously 
involved in successful cartels – and, in doing so, develop a set of capabilities and expertise that 
encourage collusion in the industry. Cartels may also be easier to organize if firms with previous 
collusive experience (or multi-cartelist firms) are involved. The incentives for managers to collude have 
also been linked to the firm’s organizational structure (e.g. Connor, 2008), the corporate culture (e.g. 
Eichenwald, 2012), and the type of executive compensation packages in place (e.g. Bloomfield et al., 
2020a).  
There is an established literature on the role played by managerial incentives in sustaining collusion. 
Footnote: See the seminal paper by Spagnolo (2000), followed by an extensive literature: Spagnolo 
2004, 2005; Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2008; Aubert, 2009; Thépot and Thépot, 2017, among others. 
We contribute to that literature by analysing a novel research question – the link between recidivism 
and cartel features. In particular, we examine whether managers’ decision to repeatedly collude is 
associated with specific cartel characteristics. This allows us to discuss the types of incentives that 
managers may have when deciding to repeatedly collude. 
While valuable, the above-mentioned literature suffers from an inherent issue of sample selection 
bias, as it examines only the detected and convicted cartels. In fact, Ormosi (2013) calculates that only 
20% of all cartels are detected. Therefore, to the extent that undetected cartels differ from detected 
ones in relevant dimensions, the results reported by the papers described above will be biased. 
To tackle this issue, we use a novel dataset of a population of cartels, which were legal in Sweden up 
until 1993. Given that these cartels were legal, firms (and managers) were not legally limited in the 
number of cartels they could be involved in. Using a dataset of a population of cartels2 allows for 
sharper inferences and eliminates the need to construct a control group of matched firms (which may 
contain undetected cartels), as is done in other studies. In particular, our analysis allows us to account 
for recidivism in a much more accurate way and sheds some light on the recent debate about the 
extent to which recidivism is or is not an important issue (Connor, 2010; Werden et al., 2011; Marvão, 
forthcoming). Since recidivism is usually linked to illegal cartel agreements, we label firms that were 
involved in more than one cartel multi-cartelists (MCs). 
We have four main results. First, in our legal cartel setting, we find that about half of cartel members 
participated in more than one agreement and few MCs being involved in up to 63 agreements over a 
 
2 See Karlsson et al. (2020) for an extended discussion on the completeness of the dataset. 
period of 46 years. Further, the majority of cartels included at least one MC and many were composed 
of only MCs. These numbers are much higher than those found in studies of convicted illegal cartels 
(Connor, 2010; Werden et al., 2011; Marvão, forthcoming) but suggest that absent cartel 
enforcement, managers will form and/or participate in many cartel agreements. 
Second, we show that cartels with MCs included more-similar firms. In particular, they included fewer 
foreign firms and had less entry and exit over the lifetime of the cartel. Relatedly, we find that cartels 
with MCs were more likely to include one or more trade associations (TAs), but there is no clear trend 
between the number of collusive agreements per firm and the involvement of a TA. The latter result 
is rather surprising, as it has been argued that TAs might play a major role in inducing managers to 
collude (e.g. Levenstein and Suslow, 2011). 
Finally, we find that cartels with MCs imposed less-strict governance rules, such as holding fewer 
meetings, engaging in less voting, and having hierarchical scheme, as collusion may be easier to 
implement and/or sustain. 
Buccirossi et al. (2013) find that the quality of cartel enforcement is the most crucial determinant of 
the effects of competition policy on total factor productivity growth. In the last decade, antitrust fines 
have increased exponentially. However, cartel fines are well below the legal cap of 10% of a firm’s 
turnover, and a new phenomenon of leniency inflation (i.e. many cartel members receiving large fine 
discounts in exchange for cooperation with an investigation) has been documented in the EU (Marvão 
and Spagnolo, 2018). Cartels remain a widespread phenomenon which is not well understood for at 
least two reasons: first, since cartels are illegal, cartel studies are biased to the extent that undetected 
cartels may be numerous and different from detected ones; second, while cartel dynamics per se have 
been extensively studied (e.g. Harrington, 2004), studies of cartel formation and/or participation at 
the managerial level and its regulatory consequences are few and recent (see e.g. González et al., 
2019; Bloomfield et al., 2020b; Combe and Monnier, 2020).  
Some authors have addressed the first issue through case studies (e.g. Asker, 2010), while others have 
addressed the second issue using data, at the cartel-level, on legal cartels (e.g. Hyytinen et al., 2019). 
We simultaneously address these issues by using firm-level data on a population of legal cartels. Our 
analysis offers some important insights. If recidivism can also be explained at the managerial level, 
designing optimal competition policies requires integrating this dimension. Further, using a population 
of legal cartels provides less-biased estimates of not only the true number of cartels in the economy, 
but also the characteristics of cartels and cartel members, such as cartel duration and welfare effects.  
Combe and Monnier (2020) discuss the “psychological cost related to public stigmatization of cartels 
or to damages inflicted to others.” In this sense, the involvement of one or several TAs in the cartel 
may establish a norm among peer firms. We therefore see two opposite effects of TAs with respect to 
incentives to collude. If TAs facilitate coordination between members (Schuldt and Taylor, 2018), this 
“help” might be less required and/or less desirable in cartels with MCs that have past (or 
contemporaneous) experience in colluding. Alternatively, if TAs facilitate collusion by setting 
“collusive norms,” MCs might be more receptive and more likely to join cartels where TAs are 
involved.3 
This article is also related to the literature on trust in dynamic games. In line with the experimental 
literature on infinitely repeated games (e.g. Bigoni et al., 2015, or Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018), meeting 
in different cartels might facilitate trust between members. Additionally, this element of trust might 
be easier to establish between similar firms which belong to the same TA and in cartels where entry 
and exit are limited.4 
 
3 Levenstein and Suslow (2011) suggest that the probability of detection for a cartel with a TA might be 
higher, as it is easier to discover when an TA acts as a cartel leader or helps to organize meetings.  
4 See Bigoni et al. (2015) for experimental evidence on trust as a deterrence channel, as well as a 
discussion on cultural similarities that may facilitate collusion. 
We also contribute to the literature on optimal deterrent cartel fines. For example, although the 
current EU fine guidelines of 2006 state that firms involved in “repeated infringements” should receive 
a fine increase, the EU Leniency Notices are not explicit as to whether or not recidivists should receive 
a lower fine reduction, if any. Marvão (2016) finds that recidivism is one of the main factors which 
positively influence the granting and scale of EU leniency reductions. As such, our results on how 
widespread recidivism is, in a legal setting, are significant. 
 
 
2. Legal cartel data and variables 
 
2.1. Our approach and dataset 
 
Although the majority of cartel studies focus on detected and convicted illegal cartels, these studies 
suffer from a well-known issue of sample bias selection. This makes it challenging to study the true 
extent of recidivism and how managers’ decisions to repeatedly collude relate to specific cartel and 
firm characteristics. We address this issue by using a novel dataset of legal cartels in Sweden.  
Despite obvious differences in cartel enforcement, there are numerous common features between 
legal and illegal cartels. In both, cartels form because they are beneficial for the cartel members 
(theoretically, the participation constraint must be fulfilled). Moreover, cartel duration depends on 
how profitable it is to deviate from the cartel agreement, partly due to the punishment strategies in 
place (theoretically, the incentive compatibility constraint must also be fulfilled). These similar cartel 
features make our analysis relevant to the analysis of the efficiency of the current antitrust 
enforcement and they provide insights not only on the prevalence but also on the features cartels 
would ideally contract on, given the possibility of doing so.  
 
2.2. The Swedish cartel register 
 
The Swedish cartel register includes 4,777 agreements registered between 1947 and 1993. The 
legislation governing the register was not specific as to what constituted a potential anti-competitive 
agreement, which resulted in a variety of supposedly collusive agreements being registered. Although 
the structure of the files in the register was mostly similar, the registration practices were very 
imprecise: some agreements were withdrawn and some of these were replaced by new ones, other 
agreements included a “cartel” composed of a group of local “cartels” and others were bilateral 
contracts with individuals. 
During the manual collection of the data, we started by identifying 3,231 unique agreements including 
at least two firms. Furthermore, there were 198 missing case numbers. However, since the register 
was transferred between four different authorities throughout the years, it is possible that the case 
numbers did not follow a specific order, such that the missing case numbers may not exist. Within the 
3,231 agreements, we then categorized the type of agreement as vertical, horizontal, or vertical and 
horizontal.  
We then coded them as collusive or non-collusive agreements. As per EU legislation, a cartel is defined 
as any horizontal agreement on pricing (including margins and discounts), market sharing (including 
quotas, discounts, and margins), or other restrictive practices, at local, national, or international level. 
Based on this definition, we classify 2,440 agreements in the register as cartels. For example, 
agreements concerning vertical collusion or agreements with no obvious competition-hindering 
clauses are not included. We also exclude industries such as civil service, defense, and public 
education, due to the lack of private actors in these sectors. Table 1 summarizes the different types 
of contract. 
Although the register was founded in 1946, no agreements were registered in its initial year. New 
agreements were registered over 32 years, between 1947 and 1978, but 50% of the registrations 
occurred in the initial 13 years. Between 1979 and the end of the register, in 1993, when Sweden 
prohibited tender cartels, no agreements were registered. 
 
 Cartel agreements Non-cartel agreements Total 
Vertical 0 649 649 
Horizontal 2261 251 2512 
Both 57 13 70 
Total   3231 
Table 1. Overview of the dataset 
 
2.3. Accounting for recidivism 
 
In our dataset, we identify the firms involved in each cartel. We code as a multi-cartelist any firm that 
participated in at least two cartel agreements, except where a new agreement substituted a previous 
one or where firms participated in contemporaneous cartels, in the same product and with the same 
group of cartel members. We measure multi-cartelism in terms of frequency, i.e. the number of cartel 
agreements they were involved in over the lifetime of the cartel register (1947–1993), and in terms of 
weight, i.e. the share of multi-cartelists per cartel. 
These are true measures of the frequency and weight of multi-cartelists. However, we expect these 
numbers to be greater than in a context where cartels are illegal, since cartel detection and deterrence 
tools are likely to reduce the number of recidivists and the number of cartels they are involved in. 
 
 
3.  Cartel formation with multi-cartelists 
 
In this section we address three specific questions: (1) How common are multi-cartelists when firms 
are allowed to form a cartel? (2) Are there substantial differences in internal mechanisms between 
cartels with and without multi-cartelists? (3) Wo are the members in multi-cartelists’ cartels? 
As we have argued already, our dataset is unique in the sense that if a manager wanted to enter a 
cartel, there was no legal obstacle to their doing so, and we assume that such an agreement is then 
registered and, thus, part of our dataset. Below we compare cartels with and without multi-cartelists. 
 
3.1. Multi-cartelists: A widespread phenomenon 
 
Recidivism is a highly debated issue. Connor (2010) suggests that there is evidence of a large amount 
of recidivism: he identified 389 recidivists worldwide between 1990 and 2009, which amounts to 
18.4% of all convicted cartel members in 648 international hardcore cartels. Werden et al. (2011) 
dispute Connor’s definition of recidivism and his calculation of the numbers of multiple and repeat 
offenders. The main discrepancy between the two arguments appears to be in how cartel members 
who merge and form a new firm are dealt with. Werden and others follow the legal practice (of the 
US DOJ and the EC), and therefore they suggest that no repeat offenders in US cartels have been fined 
since 1999. As for the EU, Marvão (2014) identified 63 multiple offenders (12%) and six repeat 
offenders (1%) since 1998, when the first leniency reduction was granted. 
In our data, we find that 48% of firms (in a total of 2,839 firms) were involved in more than one cartel 
(see Figure 1). In fact, many firms (92) were involved in as many as 51 to 63 cartels. On average, the 
firms in the data participated in five cartels. These numbers illustrate the willingness of firms to enter 
into collusive agreements, in a setting where these were not illegal. 
We also find that 78% of cartels included at least one MC and 16% of cartels were composed of 91 to 
100% of MCs (see Figure 2). 
These are important findings, as they suggest that recidivism is a widespread phenomenon. One 
explanation is the potential for “economies of scale” in being part of many cartels. This is related to 
the finding of Levenstein and Suslow (2011) that many (international and convicted) cartels with a 
large number of firms rely on the active involvement of a trade association. We explore this further in 
Section 3.3.  
Alternatively, if agreements involving MCs can increase cartel stability (as mentioned in the 
introduction), this may explain why managers decide to participate in several cartels. Figure 3 depicts 
this relationship. We show that average cartel participation was higher for MCs up to a given threshold 
(of around 30 cartels), after which it was lower than for single-cartelists. It is noteworthy that we find 
no obvious trend in the relationship between average cartel duration and the share of MCs per cartel. 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of cartels per firm 
 


































Figure 3. Average cartel duration (years) (vertical axis) by number of cartels per firm (horizontal axis) 
 
3.2. Cartel members 
 
The group of firms that constitute a cartel is a crucial element for its stability. Our dataset includes 
some information regarding the cartel members, as shown in Table 3. 
 
3.2.1. Nationality and cartel size 
The average cartel included three firms, which is much smaller than the average size of six firms in EC 
cartels (Marvão, forthcoming), but cartels included up to 27 cartel members. This figure is similar for 
cartels with and without MCs. However, cartels with MCs included very few foreign firms.  
We also examine net entry (i.e. the number of firms entering the cartel after the initial agreement 
minus those exiting the agreement). The data clearly shows that cartels with MCs were substantially 
more stable in terms of entry and exit. 
 
3.2.2. Trade associations 
It is often argued that a TA offers a propitious environment for cartel formation. Indeed, several EC 
cartel convictions indirectly involve an association. For example, in the lysine, citric acid, bathroom 
fittings, and car battery recycling cartels (convicted in 2000, 2002, 2016, and 2017, respectively), trade 
associations’ activities were used to organize parallel “unofficial meetings” where prices and 
quantities were then agreed. In the lysine cartel, the american company Archer Daniels Midland 
(ADM) “proposed that the producers attend trade association meetings quarterly to adjust their price 
and sales volumes according to their agreements. It explained how forming an industry association 
could provide a seemingly legitimate, but artificial, reason to meet, and thus conceal the fact that 
purported competitors were secretly meeting to discuss prices and sales volumes.” 
A second indirect role of associations is that they can be used to coerce new association members to 
join the cartel. In the citric acid cartel, the “General Manager of Cerestar Bioproducts was approached 
on that occasion by Hoffmann-La Roche's World Head of Marketing Vitamins and Fine Chemicals, 
whom he subsequently met on 12 February 1992 in Basel where he was ‘explained the basic 
mechanisms of the cartel’ which Cerestar Bioproducts eventually joined.” 
In the cases above, TAs serve to ease communication between the cartel members and find new cartel 
partners. However, TAs can also have direct involvement, organizing and/or enforcing antitrust 
violations such that a much larger number of firms can be effectively organized. For example, in the 
EU cement cartel (fined in 1994), the European producers and their TA agreed on a market allocation 
scheme: each competitor would sell only in its home market and export the excess production at 
previously agreed terms. In the US supermarket chains’ cartel of 1971, a cooperative association of 
supermarkets allocated markets geographically for Topco generic products, such that only one of its 
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a TA (Fachverband Verbindungs- und Befestigungstechnik) in the fasteners' cartel for organizing the 
price-fixing cartel. 
Table 2 shows that trade associations were present in 48% of the cartels but were a lot more common 
in cartels with multi-cartelists. However, the number of cartels in which multi-cartelists participate 
does not seem to matter. A visual inspection of Figure 4 shows that there is no clear link between the 
number of cartel agreements firms were involved in and the involvement of TAs. 
Levenstein and Suslow (2011) find that cartels that rely on TAs are less likely to end due to a “natural 
death.” In our data, we find no link between cartel duration and the involvement of TAs in a cartel 
agreement, while Karlsson et al. (2020) find only a weak effect of TAs on cartel formation and cartel 
death. Levenstein and Suslow (2011) also find that many cartels with a large number of members are 
sustained by the active involvement of a TA. Once more, we find no clear trend between these two 
variables. As we argued in the introduction, this finding may be the result of two opposite effects: 
(i)TAs should contribute to the cartel’s stability by setting the norm or facilitating the coordination of 
cartel members; but (ii) with more experienced cartel members, TAs should be less “necessary.” 
 
 #firms # foreign firms Net entry TA(s) involved 
 Max Av. Max Av. Av. % cartels 
With MCs 20 3.34 2 0.09 0.73 38.5% 
No MCs 27 3.73 12 0.13 7.60 9.5% 
Overall 27 3.45 12 0.14 2.05 47.9% 





Figure 4.  Cartels per firm, with(out) trade association(s) 
 
3.3. Cartel governance 
 
Due to the illegal nature of cartels, very little is known about their internal governance. This is because, 
cartels do not usually formalize sanctions, hierarchy, and other internal mechanisms. However, many 
legal cartel agreements were explicit about whether they included sanctions, fines, formal meetings, 
a dispute resolution mechanism, a strict voting mechanism, and an explicit hierarchical system.  
 
Table 3 summarizes these results. For example, the data shows that 44% of the cartel agreements 














suspension from the agreement to full exclusion or the member having to sell their product under 
conditions (e.g., to another member for a low price or to specific customers). 
 
The sample is also split between cartels with and without MCs. While many characteristics are similar, 
two are worth highlighting. First, cartels with MCs were less likely to hold meetings. This may mean 
that these firms were also meeting for other cartels or that they had already established a (collusive) 
relationship which decreased the need for meetings. In fact, Levenstein et al. (2016) argue that norms 
established during explicit cartel agreements ease the subsequent engagement of the members in 
tacit collusion without explicit communication.  
Second, voting mechanisms were a lot less common in cartels with MCs. Overall, cartels with MCs 
appear to have less-strict rules and less-formal mechanisms. 
 
 Sanctions Fines Meetings 
 N Count % N Count % N Count % 
With MCs 760 322 42% 1715 21 1% 1800 382 21% 
No MCs 165 84 51% 440 8 2% 498 218 44% 
Overall 925 406 44% 2155 29 1% 2298 600 26% 
 Dispute resolution Voting Hierarchy 
 N Count % N Count % N Count % 
With MCs 1793 984 55% 1794 343 19% 1808 129 7% 
No MCs 504 336 67% 505 208 41% 509 147 29% 
Overall 2297 1320 57% 2299 551 24% 2317 276 12% 





This article sheds some light on cartel participation when managers of a given firm repeatedly collude. 
We use a unique dataset of legal cartels registered in Sweden, and which operated after the end of 
the Second World War and until the cartel ban in 1993. In particular, we are able to observe recidivism 
in a population of cartels, thus overcoming the usual issue of sample selection bias in studies of 
detected and convicted illegal cartels. 
We describe some interesting differences between cartels with and without multi-cartelists. Our 
analysis shows that, absent legal cartel enforcement, firms collude in many cartels and most cartels 
include recidivists. Cartels with recidivists are also shown to include more-homogeneous firms and to 
be more stable in terms of cartel size. Further, we show that cartel agreements differ greatly in their 
internal governance when they include recidivists. Such cartels appear to have less strict rules, with 
fewer meetings, fewer voting mechanisms and a less delineated hierarchy. Finally, we find that cartels 
with and without recidivists do not differ in terms of size or involvement of trade associations. The 
latter result is rather surprising as it is often argued that trade associations might play a major role in 
inducing managers to repeatedly collude. 
Our results contribute to the current debate on the importance and extent of recidivism, exploiting 
managers’ willingness to collude (repeatedly), absent law enforcement. These results help us in 
understanding recidivism in the current climate of (potentially) weak law enforcement in terms of 
detected cartels (e.g. Ormosi (2013) suggests that 80% of cartels are undetected) and lack of optimal 
enforcement tools (e.g. Marvão and Spagnolo (2018) suggest that without criminalization, treble 
damages and with leniency inflation, EC fines are sub-optimal). 
Our data does however not allow us to account for individual (un)observable characteristics of 
managers (e.g. risk aversion and managerial compensation) that determine their repeated 
participation in cartels. This would be an interesting avenue for further study.  
  
References 
1. Ashton, J. and Pressey, A., 2012. Who manages cartels? the role of sales and marketing managers 
within international cartels: Evidence from the european union 1990-2009 (No. 2012-01). CCP, 
University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 
2. Asker, J., 2010. A study of the internal organization of a bidding cartel. American Economic 
Review, 100(3), 724-62. 
3. Aubert, Cécile, 2009. Managerial effort incentives and market collusion. TSE Working paper series, 
09-127. 
4. Bigoni, M., Fridolfsson, S.O., Le Coq, C. and Spagnolo, G., 2015. Trust, leniency, and deterrence. 
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 31(4), 663-689.  
5. Bloomfield, M., Marvão, C., and Spagnolo, G., 2020(a). Relative Performance Evaluation, Sabotage 
and Collusion. CEPR working paper 15115 
6. Bloomfield, M., Marvão, C., and Spagnolo, G., 2020(b). Revealed preferences and cartel 
accountability. Mimeo 
7. Buccirossi, P., Ciari, L., Duso, T., Spagnolo, G. and Vitale, C., 2013. Competition policy and 
productivity growth: An empirical assessment. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(4), 1324-
1336. 
8. Buccirossi, Paolo and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008. Corporate Governance and Collusive Behavior, 
in 2 Issues in Competition Law and Policy (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008), chapter 51, p.1219-
1240 
9. Connor, J.M., 2008. Global Price Fixing: 2nd Paperback Edition. 
10. Connor, J.M., 2010. Recidivism revealed: private international cartels 1991-2009. Available at 
SSRN 1688508. 
11. Dal Bó, P. and Fréchette, G.R., 2018. On the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated 
games: A survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 56(1), 60-114.  
12. Damgaard M., Duke C., Huck S., and B. Wallace, The Impact of Competition Interventions on 
Compliance and Deterrence: A Controlled Economic Experiment, London Economics for the OFT 
81 (2012). 
13. Eichenwald, K., 2012. The informant. Portobello Books. 
14. González, T., Schmid, M., Yermack, D., 2019. Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?, 
Management Science 2019 65:10, 4813-4840 
15. González, T.A., Schmid, M. and Yermack, D., 2019. Does price fixing benefit corporate 
managers?. Management Science, 65(10), 4813-4840. 
16. Grout, P. A., Sonderegger, S. 2005. Predicting cartels. Economic discussion paper. Office of Fair 
Trading. 
17. Harrington, J., 2004. Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority. The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 35 (4), 651-673. 
18. Hyytinen, A., Steen, F. and Toivanen, O., 2019. An anatomy of cartel contracts. The Economic 
Journal, 129(621), 2155-2191. 
19. Karlsson, T., Le Coq, C., Marvão, C., Cartels’ birth and death dynamics: Empirical evidence, 2020. 
Mimeo 
20. Levenstein, M., Marvão, C., Suslow, V., 2016. Preventing Cartel Recidivism. Antitrust 30(3):157-
171, summer 2016. 
21. Levenstein, M., Suslow, V., 2011. Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of cartel Duration, The 
Journal of Law & Economics, 54 (2), S. 455–492. 
22. Marvão, C., Cartel Activity and Recidivism, Research Handbook on Cartels, Chapter 21, Edward 
Elgar Publishing (forthcoming). 
23. Marvão, C., Spagnolo, G., 2018. Should Price Fixers Finally Go to Prison? - Criminalization, Leniency 
Inflation and Whistleblower Rewards in the EU, SSRN Working Paper 3180685 
24. Marvão, C., The EU Leniency Programme and Recidivism, Review of Industrial Organization 
(2/2016) 48(1): 1-27 
25. Monnier, C. and Combe, E., 2020. Why Managers Engage in Price Fixing? An Analytical 
Framework. World Competition, 43(1). 
26. Ormosi, P., 2013. A tip of the iceberg? The probability of catching cartels. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics, 29 (4), 549-566. 
27. Pirrong, S., 1992. An Application of Core Theory to the Analysis of Ocean Shipping Markets, 35 J.L. 
& ECON. 89 
28. Schuldt, R., Taylor, J., 2018. Cartel Attributes and Cartel Performance: The Impact of Trade 
Associations. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 66(1), 1-29. 
29. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2000. Stock-related compensation and product-market compensation. RAND 
Journal of Economics, 31(1), p.22-42 
30. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2004. Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device: “Everybody Happy But the 
Consumer”. Stockholm School of Economics, Working Papers in Economics and Finance No. 243 
31. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. Managerial Incentives and collusive behavior. European Economic 
Review 49, p.1501-1523 
32. Spar, D.L., 1994. The cooperative edge: The Internal politics of international cartels. Cornell 
University Press. 
33. Thépot, Florence and Thépot, Jacques. 2017. Collusion, Managerial Incentives and Antitrust Fines. 
Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion & Economic Working Paper 2017-06 
34. Werden, G.J., Hammond, S.D. and Barnett, B.A., 2011. Recidivism eliminated: Cartel enforcement 
in the United States since 1999. Available at SSRN 1927864. 
